MEMORANDUM

6886

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

INFORMATION

January 16, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR:

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM:

LINCOLN BLOOMFIELD

SUBJECT:

Classified Annex

Attached hereto is the would-be classified annex to my paper entitled "Carter Human Rights Policy: A Provisional Appraisal." References are made in several places in the paper to this annex, which is explained in a footnote on page 1 of the paper. However, I am completely convinced it is worth doing, since it is so spotty in nature and does not have the benefit of the XX material, as you know (although clearly some of it is reflected not only here but also in the paper, as classified events become public). I think you should decide whether the classified annex is worth anything, but in any event I would like to feel that the larger paper will stand on its own feet and can be taken as covering the general subject very comprehensively. In any event, references are made to the annex on the following pages of the paper, in case you decide against the annex (the footnote on page 1 should also be deleted): 9, 19a, 30, 37 and 46. The page numbers of course refer to my own draft. (U)

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PRM / NSC-28 of May 20, 1977 (refer to reference, p. 9). One paragraph of the PRM instructed that a review be made of "National Security Aspects of US Policies on Human Rights, Including Consideration of the Impact on: US-Soviet Detente; Friendly States and Allies; and Other Areas of Major Strategic Concern such as the PRC and the Koreas." (C)

Chile. In 1977 during an internal argument on whether the Vice-President should meet with Opposition Leader Frei, Dr. Brzezinski was active in pressing for the visit, over the opposition of ARA in the Department of State. (C)

Ecuador. The President's influence was direct on the election in Ecuador (as it had been in the Dominican Republic). (page 30). (C)

El Salvador. On August 8, 1980, the President decided: "If there is specific improvement in the performance of human rights . . . the US would be prepared to release six helicopters on a no-cost basis. . . " (S)

Argentina. Much of the story is told in the unclassified text, but the following are the available classified references:

March 21, 1979: Dr. Brzezinski responded to a Department of State recommendation for a tougher approach toward Argentina with a statement that while "Argentine human rights record is the worst in the hemisphere," we should move carefully and explain our policy widely in advance — a policy of remaining "cool and correct" until dramatic improvements took place in human rights and toward democratization. The bottom line of this memorandum was to delay the implementation of a tougher approach until the report was made to the Inter-American Human Rights Commission (which Argentina had already agreed to receive), and not to have any more negative votes on these grounds in the international institutions, cut Export-Import Bank credits, or hold a PRC, in the meanwhile. (C) (This and other references in the text are found on pages 19A, 37, and 46.)

January 8, 1980: The President said that we should encourage trading-off the specific human rights improvements in Argentina against US not voting to condemn Argentina in the UN Human Rights Commission. (C)

January 28, 1980: Dr. Brzezinski wrote on the draft of the 1979 country report on Argentina: "Careful on Argentina Department of State, AGISAPSERP

CECDEM

Review January 16, 1987

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## Argentina (continued)

May 14, 1980: A PRC was held on Argentina which, on the basis of rapidly improving Soviet - Argentine relations, and since the human rights policy had impeded US - Argentine relations for four years, agreed to seek improvement, "assuming continued improvements in human rights matters," in the context of the systematic effort to strengthen US - Argentine ties. The President's notation on this recommendation was: "I'm inclined to move faster." (S)

June 14, 1980: The Department of State proposed to "begin to rebuild relations to increase contact and consultations, while stressing that further progress on human rights will be essential to more fundamental improvements in these relations . . . " Argentina was pressed to accept the resolution of the OAS, recognize the role of the Inter-American Human Rights Commission, and ensure that there were no new disappearances; that due process would be provided detainees, that it would guarnatee against torture, and a reduction in the number of political prisoners held without charge. The Interagency Group (IG) recommended that since the UN was dealing with the question of four "disappeareds," this should not be a central requirement for improved bilateral relations with the US, but that we should urge Argentina to cooperate with multilateral organizations. (S)

The President concurred in the PRC recommendations, and indicated that he wanted the same process followed with "other difficult countries." On July 11, Dr. Brzezinski sent the Secretary of State added instructions the gist of which was that "DOD / JCS and other agencies involved with Argentina should continually reaffirm the importance which the Carter Administration attaches to human rights and democratization." But on October 18, 1980, on the recommendations of the Secretary of State, the Administration backed away from some elements of the package. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski - Personal. Jessica Mathews' Evening Report for August 22, 1978, contained a notation that Dr. Brzezinski had remarked to her on the previous week that the human rights policy had "ruined" US relations with Chile, Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay. Demurring, Dr. Mathews blamed the problems that had arisen on attempts to "implement ill-advised Congressional directives," particularly those mandating human rights actions on OPIC and the Ex-Im Bank -- "the Harkins Amendments." An historic footnote: The staff had information that Dr. Brzezinski's reaction to the damage caused by US policy took place the day after former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had reported to Dr. Brzezinski on the private results of the Carter trip to Argentina. (S)

The NSC has waived their classification equity for information within this White House/NSC document.

Your agency has been determined to be the agency of primary interest.

Please review for your agency's equities and obtain any necessary concurrences.

CEART L

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BOX 131

Human Rts Policy, 1/81

Doc 1 also in folder - not copied (very com)

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